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ABSTRACT
To ease the transition towards the future of distribution
grid management, regulators must revise the current in-
teraction model, that is, the set of rules guiding the inter-
actions between all the parties of the system. Five interac-
tion models are proposed, three of them considering active
network management. This paper evaluates the economic
efficiency of each model using macroscopic representation
of the system, by opposition to more techniques requiring a
complete picture of the system. The interaction models are
simulated on the horizon 2015-2030. Results show that for
the first five years all the models provide similar economic
efficiency. For the remaining ten years, interaction models
implementing active network management provide up to a
10% higher economic efficiency.
INTRODUCTION
Distribution systems were typically designed to face peak
consumption or production without considering any coor-
dinated control action on the production or on the con-
sumption side. However, increasing the amount of renew-
able generation in distribution networks using the same
design rules may lead to large network capacity upgrade
costs. Active network management (ANM) is an alterna-
tive that could allow to postpone or avoid these upgrade
costs [1]. However, adapting the regulatory framework is
necessary to ease the transition between the current situ-
ation and the future of distribution grid management. An
appropriate regulatory framework is essential to optimize
the benefits within a deregulated environment [2].
An interaction model is a set of rules in a regulatory frame-
work that guides the interactions between all the parties of
the system. Although the methodology applied in this pa-
per is general, we define and study five interaction models
among the numerous possible candidates. In the first two
interaction models, the distribution system operator (DSO)
does not use ANM and either restricts or not the access to
its network to the grid users. The three remaining models
are focused on flexibility service usage for ANM. In model
3, the DSO may restrain the users without providing any fi-
nancial compensation except for the imbalance created by
its request. In model 4, the grid user is compensated fi-
nancially for the activation request of the DSO. In the last
model, the DSO places no access restriction on to the grid
users and relies on voluntary remunerated flexibility ser-
vices to operate its network.
Several attempts to define interaction models for the ex-
change of flexibility within a distribution system are pro-
posed in the literature. An example of specifications to
exchange flexibility services is proposed in [3], which
streamlines the relevant business interactions and illus-
trates the concept on a low-voltage transformer overload
case study. Another framework to coordinate the flexibility
usage on a low-voltage feeder based on flexibility margins
imposed to controllable resources is proposed in [4]. Ben-
efits of tariff based flexibility services directly controlled
by the DSO is investigated in [5]. The business case from
the DSO perspective of dynamic line rating, demand side
management and network reinforcement on a MV-grid use
case is elaborated in [6].
This paper evaluates the economic efficiency of each
model using a macroscopic representation of the system,
by opposition to more complex techniques that require a
complete picture of the system [7], [8]. In particular, the
analysis uses data that can be easily obtained for each quar-
ter of the year, such as the total production and consump-
tion in the distribution network. These productions and
consumptions provide an approximation of the flexibility
needs of the DSO for each quarter of the year. Depend-
ing on the interaction model, these flexibility needs can be
matched either by shedding production/consumption, re-
straining the grid users or activating flexibility services.
Using approximation of the different prices, we evaluate
the costs on this typical year of the DSO, the producers and
the retailers. The economic efficiency of each interaction
model can be estimated on the long term by repeating the
process for each year of the time horizon using forecasts of
the production, consumption, energy prices, etc.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we present the
candidate interaction models to evaluate. Second, the pro-
cedure to evaluate quantitatively the proposed models is
described. Results on a year representative of the expected
trends toward the year 2025 are presented in the third sec-
tion. Results of a complete simulation of the horizon 2015-
2030 are presented in the fourth section.
CANDIDATE INTERACTION MODELS
An important part of ANM is devoted to the coordination
for the usage of flexibility to operate a distribution system.
How the flexibility services may be exchanged depends on
the interaction model that the agents must follow.
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Model 1. The DSO does not use any flexibility service and
does not restrict grid users.
Model 2. The DSO does not use any flexibility service. To
ensure the safety of its system the DSO restricts the users
to a safe full access range computed on a yearly basis.
Model 3. An access contract specifies a full access range
and a wider flexible access range. These access bounds
are represented in Figure 1. The grid user may produce
or consume without any restriction within the full access
range, which is computed on a yearly basis. The full ac-
cess range is determined such that no ANM strategies are
needed if all grid users are in their full access range. If
necessary, the DSO may ask a grid user to restrain its pro-
duction or consumption in the full access range in critical
periods where the agent is in its flexible access range. This
restriction does not lead to financial compensation by the







Figure 1: Visual representation of the access bounds.
Model 4. This model is equivalent to Model 3 but the DSO
pays for the activation of the flexibility of the grid users.
For instance, this case allows producers to recover from
the loss of the subsidies for renewable energy generation.
Model 5. The DSO acts as a simple flexibility user like
the TSO or every BRP. The DSO does not restrict the grid-
users and relies on the flexibility offered by the other agents
to operate its network.
A modulation request by the DSO to a grid user is a re-
duction of its production or consumption to ensure the safe
operation of its system. A modulation influences the to-
tal balance of the system with respect to the announced
total production and consumption. The imbalance created
by a modulation is paid by some parties in the system. The
choice of the parties responsible for the imbalance depends
on the interaction model. In the last three interaction mod-
els we consider that the DSO is responsible for the im-
balance. The economic performance of the five models is
evaluated using the procedure described in the next section.
EVALUATION PROCEDURE
The evaluation of the interaction models is done by getting
an approximation of the actions to take for each quarter of
a typical year. To obtain a base scenario for each quar-
ter of a typical year, the simulation is based on historical
production and consumption data. The consumption data
comes from the total consumption monitored in 2013 by
ELIA, the Belgian transmission system operator [9]. The
production curve is taken from a real wind production unit
in 2013. These curves are scaled to match a given mean
and maximum value on the whole year. The resulting pro-
duction and consumption values for each period t of the
simulated year are denoted respectively by Ppt and Pct . The
energy and imbalance price curves are processed alike tak-
ing as a basis the BELPEX day-ahead energy market prices
of 2013 [10]. The net export from the distribution network
in a period t is given by Nt = P
p
t −Pct . If this net export is
greater than the capacity of the network C, actions needs
to be taken do deal with the exceeding production. For
the sake of conciseness, we do not consider the case where
Nt < −C as distribution networks are usually designed to
satisfy the peak consumption. Note that in the Model 5, Ppt
is capped to C to model the safety restriction of the DSO.
The next step decides for each period t what are the quan-
tities of flexibility activated on the production side and on
the demand side and the production quantities curtailed,
Rpt . For Model 1, if Nt >C, then R
p
t = Nt−C. For the other
interaction models Rpt are the remaining exceeding quan-
tity that could not be handled using flexibility services.
In Models 3 to 5, the DSO uses flexibility to deal with
the exceeding energy Nt −C. Regarding the flexibility
on the production side, the maximum quantity available
is bounded by the total production. The cost for the DSO
to use this production flexibility is equal to the imbalance
price plus the flexibility cost depending on the interaction
model. In Model 3, there is no flexibility cost. In Model
4, the DSO pays only for the activation and in Model 5
the DSO pays for the reservation and the activation of the
flexibility. The DSO may also use flexibility from the de-
mand side. The total amount available is computed by βPct
where β is the flexibility ratio of the demand side. We
consider that a modulation of the demand side in one pe-
riod induces an equal modulation in the opposite direction
in the next period. The costs for the DSO to use the flexi-
bility spans on two periods, the period t and the following
one, t + 1, to consider this payback effect. Therefore a
modulation Fct modifies the consumption in the next pe-
riod such that Nt+1 := P
p
t+1−Pct+1 +Fct . As a result, we
consider that the DSO pays the imbalance created in pe-
riod t and t + 1. However, the reservation and activation
is paid only for the period t. A last criterion to check be-
fore using demand side flexibility is that the payback effect
does not cause problems in the period t + 1. To remove a
congestion using flexibility, the DSO chooses the cheapest
option between the production and the demand side if the
payback effect allows its use.
The final step is the computation for the period t of the
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surpluses and the costs of each actors. These surpluses
and costs are computed following the interaction models
directives using if needed a reservation and/or an activa-
tion price for the flexibility provided. Producers earn sur-
pluses from selling electricity at the day-ahead energy mar-
ket price and must cover their marginal production costs.
Retailers buy energy to the day-ahead market and earn
money from the retailing activity whose tariff is fixed for
the whole year. The network management costs imputable
to the DSO is given by the cost of activating flexibility. A
welfare is computed as the sum of the surpluses minus the
costs of each actor. A penalty term is added for the pro-
duction and the consumption shed assuming a value of lost
production and a value of lost load.
The whole evaluation procedure was implemented in
Python and run on several scenarios as detailed in the next
sections.
FOCUS ON 2025
This section shows results for a one year simulation corre-
sponding to the expectation of 2025. The maximum capac-
ity of the network is assumed to be 40MW. The marginal
production costs of producers is fixed to −45e/MWh.
This cost is negative to take into account the subsidies
for renewable production. The value of lost load is
fixed to 1000e/MWh and the one of lost production to
500e/MWh. The flexibility prices of the producers are
20e/MW for the reservation and 45e/MWh at the activa-
tion. For the retailers, the flexibility has a reservation cost
of 5e/MW and no activation cost. Remaining parameters
values can be found in Table 2 for the year 2025.
The mean expected production and consumption for the
simulated year are respectively 93805 and 140525MWh or
a mean by day of 257 and 385MWh. The maximum pro-
duction for one hour is 76.4MWh and the maximum con-
sumption 25.1MWh. The energy production exceeding the
network capacity for each day is shown in Figure 2 and is
handled as explained in the previous section.
A comparison of the models is provided in Table 1 where
the figures are aggregated by day. Over the year, the mean
lack of capacity is 21.9MWh which represents 5.69% of
the total production. Models 3−5 obtain identical welfares
as their only difference is the remuneration of the flexibil-
ity from the DSO to the producers. The flexibility from
the demand side is not used by the DSO due to the imbal-
ance costs. This is the consequence of having imbalance
prices greater than prices of the production side flexibility
services. In Model 5, the flexibility of the demand side is
cheaper for some hours but the payback effects prevents
using it.
TRENDS TO 2030
The expected evolution of the macroscopic parameters can
be obtained from [11]. This report provides the devel-
opment of the EU energy system under current trends
and policies in the EU27 and its Member States. An
evolution of the gross wind onshore generation is fore-
casted for 2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030 of respectively 72,
146, 204 and 276TWh. The after tax energy prices for
industry should be approximately of 92, 101, 104 and
98e/MWh. The expected electricity consumption is about
3000, 3194,3370 and 3515TWh. These expected evolu-
tions are used to obtain the parameters of our network in
the horizon 2015-2030 based on the 2015 figures. The ob-
tained expected parameters are summarized in Table 2.
2015 2020 2025 2030
Demand
mean 9.70 10.33 10.90 11.37 MW
max 19.0 20.23 21.34 22.26 MW
Production
mean 10.0 12.84 16.04 18.68 MW
max 40.0 51.37 64.16 74.72 MW
Electricity price
mean 47.45 52.09 53.64 50.54 e/MWh
max 82.3 90.35 93.03 87.67 e/MWh
Retailing price 60.5 66.42 68.39 64.45 e/MWh
Table 2: Expected evolution of the parameters of the eval-
uation procedure.
Figure 3 shows the expected evolution of a system welfare
for the five interaction models and the 15 years horizon.
The first three years, all the models perform similarly with
a difference of welfare of less than 2%. Model 1 welfare
increases until 2021 then decreases constantly due to the
high necessity of production shedding. By restricting the
production, Model 2 achieves reasonable welfares at about
10% of the one of Models 3 to 5 for the five last years. The
cumulative welfare of Model 1 and 2 are respectively 24%
and 7% smaller than the one of Models 3 to 5.
As the welfare of Models 3 to 5 are identical, selecting
one of these models should be based on other criteria. The
main difference is the amount that the DSO pays to the
producers. These models impacts the actors costs and rev-
enues favoring either the producers or the DSO. The active
network management costs paid by the DSO for the Model
3, 4 and 5 are represented in Figure 4. Model 3 achieves the
minimum cost for the DSO and comes from the payment
for the imbalance created by the activation of flexibility
services. On the last five years, Model 4 and 5 cost respec-
tively around 3.5 and 4.5 times more than Model 3 to the
DSO. The cumulative costs of Model 3 and 4 on the whole
horizon are respectively 21% and 76% of the cumulative
costs of Model 5.
CIRED 2015 3/5
23rd International Conference on Electricity Distribution Lyon, 15-18 June 2015
Paper 0684
Figure 2: Simulation of the expected production exceeding the network capacity for each day in 2025.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
min mean max min mean max min mean max min mean max min mean max
Welfare -13903 26450 8301 -4385 34059 6221 -4385 37217 8575 -4385 37217 8575 -4385 37217 8575 e
DSO costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1013 389 919 -183 1358 1986 0 1789 2461 e
Producers surplus -2031 35346 9172 -2031 32189 7070 -2031 35735 9497 -2031 36704 9957 -2031 37135 10167 e
Retailers surplus -3347 1871 648 -3347 1871 648 -3347 1871 648 -3347 1871 648 -3347 1871 648 e
Over-capacity 0 21.5 32.9 0 0 0.5 0 21.5 32.9 0 21.5 32.9 0 21.5 32.9 Mwh
Prod. flexibility 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21.5 32.9 0 21.5 32.9 0 21.5 32.9 Mwh
Prod. shedding 0 21.5 32.9 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Mwh
Table 1: General daily results for the five interaction models for the expected 2025 year.
Figure 3: Mean daily welfare of the five interaction models
in e for the 15 years horizon.
CONCLUSION
This paper evaluates the economic efficiency of five can-
didate interaction models using a macroscopic system rep-
resentation. In two interaction models, DSO does not use
Figure 4: Mean active network management daily costs of
the five interaction models in e for the 15 years horizon.
ANM and either restrict or not the access to its network
to the grid users. The three remaining models are focused
on flexibility service usage for ANM and differs only on
the financial compensation for the provided flexibility ser-
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vices. These five models are first evaluated quantitatively
using expected data for a typical network in 2025 accord-
ing to the expected energy trends to 2030 [11]. The eco-
nomic efficiency of each interaction model is estimated on
the long term by repeating the process for each year of the
horizon 2015-2030 using forecasts of the evolution of the
parameters of the simulation.
Results show that for the first five years, the five models
provide similar economic efficiency. For the remaining
ten years, active network management interaction mod-
els clearly provide higher economic efficiency. The ANM
models are identical from a welfare perspective. Select-
ing one of these models should be based on other criteria.
These models impact the actors costs and revenue favor-
ing either the producers or the DSO. The main difference
between the models is the amount of money that the DSO
pays to the producers. For instance, not remunerating the
producer for the subsidies’ loss due to the curtailment of
a renewable generation may discourage future investments
in renewable generation in distribution networks.
This quantitative analysis could be extended along several
lines. The results should be put with regard to invest-
ments planning [12]. An additional study could arbitrate
if putting in place the infrastructure for ANM is econom-
ically efficient. To do so, the cost of setting up this in-
frastructure should be evaluated. If ANM solutions are
still cost efficient considering the set up cost, an additional
study could obtain the best number of years to delay net-
work reinforcement considering active network manage-
ment. Finally, a more detailed investigation of the models
could be considered to confirm that every party of the sys-
tem behaves as expected given a set of rules. Such simu-
lation would model the behavior of each actor individually
in a specific interaction model as it is done in [8]. This
detailed analysis is the object of an additional paper [13].
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